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[Crim. No. 5822. In Bank. Feb. 24, 1956.J 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JAMES F ARRARA et al, 
Appellants. 
[1] Gaming-Evidence.-Convictions of recording bets on horse 
races (Pen. Code, § 337a, subd. 4) and of occupying premises 
for the purpose of bookmaking were sustained by evidence 
that an officer, on searching one defendant, found keys, 8 
scratch sheet for a date prior to that of the search and several 
pieces of paper identified as records of bets for races run 
on such date, and by evidence that officers, with the use of one 
key taken from such defendant, gained entrance to an apart-
ment in which they found the other defendant with a scratch 
sheet and several pieces of paper similar to those taken from 
the first defendant, that these papers were identified as records 
of bets in the second defendant's handwriting for races run on 
the date of the search, and that she admitted taking bets over 
the telephone for two days. 
[2] Criminal Law-Venue.-The evidence in a bookmaking pros-
ecution was sufficient to justify the trial court in finding that 
the venue was in a certain county where one defendant ad-
[1] See Cal.Jur.~d, Gaming and Prize Contests, § 68. 
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Gaming, § 22(4); [2] Criminal Law, 
§ 79; [3] Searches and Seizures, § 1; [4] Criminal Law, § 1271. 
) 
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mitted taking bets in an apartment located in that eounty, 
where the other defendant was observed at or near the apart-
ment on the dates of the transactions in question, and where 
defendants' home was also located in such eounty. 
[Sa, Sb] Searches and Seizures--Presumptions and Inferences.-
In a prosecution for bookmaking, where it eould be inferred 
that the arresting officers had some information indicating 
guilt, but that they did not enter an apartment with the 
occupants' consent, and where there was no evidence as to 
whether such information was sufficient to eonstitute reason-
able cause to justify the arrests or whether the entry was 
preceded by the demand and explanation required by Pen. 
Code, § 844, but objection was first made on appeal, it was 
to be presumed, in the absence of contrary evidence, that the 
officers regularly and lawfully performed their duties in 
making the arrests and the searches and seizures incident 
thereto. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subds. 1, 15, 33.) 
[4] Criminal Law - Appeal- PresumptioDS.-Error will not be 
presumed on appeal. 
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County granting probation and denying a new trial. 
Clement D. Nye, Judge. Affirmed. 
G. Vernon Brumbaugh for Appellants. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Joan D. Gross, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants James and Helen Farrara 
appeal from orders granting them probation and denying 
their motion for a new trial entered after they were found 
guilty of violations of Penal Code, section 337a. A jury 
trial was waived and it was stipulated that the case should 
be submitted on the transcript of the preliminary hearing. 
Each defendant was found guilty of one count of recording 
bets on horse races (Pen. Code, § 337a, subd. (4», and Helen 
was found guilty of one count of occupying premises for 
the purpose of bookmaking. (Pen. Cede, § 337a subd. (2).) 
On October 28, 1954, Officer Sherrer of the Los Angeles 
Police Department observed James Farrara get into his car 
near the corner of 8th and Cochran in Los Angeles. Two 
other officers got into the car with James and the car was 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq. j Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 
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driven for a little less than a block. James then got out of 
the car, and Officer Sherrer searched him. He found keys, 
11 scratch sheet for October 27th, and several pieces of paper 
t hat were identified as records of bcts for races run on the 
~7th. Although James told Officer Sherrer that he d,id not 
know anything about these papers, there was evidence that 
the handwriting was his. 
Shortly thereafter at approximately 12.35 p. m. on October 
28th, Officer Sherrer and two other officers gained entrance 
to an apartment about half a block away on South Cochran 
by the use of one of the keys taken from James. They found 
Helen Farrara in the bedroom with a scratch sheet for October 
28th and several pieces of paper similar to those taken from 
J ames. These papers were identified as records of bets in 
Helen's handwriting for races run on the 28th, and Helen 
admitted taking bets over the telephone for two days. The 
apartment was regularly occupied by Maxine Shaman, a 
friend of the defendants, who was present when the officers 
arrived.-
Before the arrests, the officers had had the apartment and 
defendants under observation and had seen both of them go 
to the apartment on the 27th. J ames arrived before 10 a. m. 
and left shortly after 1 p. m. Helen left her home about 12 :30 
p. m., went to the apartment, and left there at about 5 :25 p. m. 
Neither defendant took the stand or presented any evidence 
other than by cross-examining prosecution witnesses. 
[1] The foregoing evidence is sufficient to support the 
conclusion of the trial court that each defendant was guilty 
of recording bets and that Helen was guilty of occupying the 
apartment "with papcrs ... for the purpose of recording 
... bets." (Pen. Code, § 337a, subd. (2).) [2] There is no 
merit in defendants' contention that venue was not proved. 
Helen admitted taking bets in the apartment, which was 
located in Los Angeles County, and James was observed at 
or near the apartment on both the 27th and the 28th. More-
over, since the defendants' home was also located in Los 
Angeles, it may reasonably be inferred that James did not 
leave the county to record the bets on races run on the 27th. 
Defendants contend that the officers did not have reasonable 
cause to believe that either of them had committed a felony 
and that the arrests and the searches and seizures incident 
·Maxine Shaman was also charged with violations of Penal Code, 
section 837a, but as to her the information was Bet aBide pursuant to 
her motion made under Penal Code, Beetion 995. 
) 
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thereto were therefore illegal. In addition, Helen contends 
that the officers violated section 844 of the Penal Code by 
using the key to enter the apartment to make an arrest 
without first "having demanded admittance and explained 
the purpose for which admittance is desired." Accordingly, 
they conclude that the evidence should have been excluded. 
[3a] This case was tried before the decision in People v. 
Cahan,44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905], no objection was made 
to the introduction of the evidence in the trial court, and no 
evidence was presented for the purpose of showing whether 
or not the officers acted lawfully. Thus it does not appear 
whether or not the officers had warrants for defendants' ar-
rest or for the search of the premises or reasonable cause to 
believe that they had committed a felony. From the fact, 
however, that the officers had defendants and the apartment 
under observation, it may be inferred that they had some 
information indicating guilt, but the record is completely 
silent as to whether or not such information was sufficient to 
constitute reasonable cause to justify the arrests. Similarly, 
it may be inferred from the fact that the officers used the key 
taken from James to enter the apartment they did not enter 
with the consent of the occupants, but the record is also com-
pletely silent as to whether or not the entry was preceded 
by the demand and explanation required by section 844. 
In People v. Kitchens, ante, p. 260 [294 P.2d 17], we 
held that the rule that the admissibility of evidence will not 
be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a proper objection 
in the trial court, is not applicable to appeals based on the 
admission of illegally obtained evidence in eases that were 
tried before the Cahan decision. We were careful to point 
out, however, that there was "sufficient evidence in the 
. record to support the conclusion that the search and seizure 
at the time of defendant's arrest were unlawful." In B(Jd~1lo 
v. Superior Court, post, p. 269 [294 P.2d 23], we held 
in this respect that "the defendant makes a prima facie 
case when he establishes that an arrest was made without a 
warrant or that private premises were entered or a search 
made without a search warrant, and the burden then 'rests 
on the prosecution to show proper justification. [Citations.]" 
[4, 3b] In the present case, on the contrary, there is no 
such evidence, and to reverse the judgment it would be neces-
sary to presume that the officers acted illegal1y and that the 
trial court erred in admitting the evidence so obt.ained. It is 
settled, however, that error will not be presumed on appeal 
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(Vaughn v. Jonas, 31 Ca1.2d 586, 601 [191 P.2d 432] ; People 
v. Gutierrez, 35 Ca1.2d 721, 727 [221 P.2d 22]; Lynch v. 
Birdwell, 44 Ca1.2d 839, 846-847 [285 P.2d 919]; People v. 
McManis, 122 Ca1.App.2d 891, 899 [266 P.2d 134]), and in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary it must also be pre-
sumed that the officers regularly and lawfully performed 
their duties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963 subds. (1), (15), (33) ; 
People v. Serrano, 123 Cal.App. 339, 341 [11 P.2d 81] ; see 
also Vaughn v. Jonas, supra, 31 Cal.2d 586, 601.) 
The orders are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., eoncurred. 
Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in People 
v. Martin, Crim. 5758, ante, p. 106 (293 P.2d 52], and 
People v. Beard, Crim. 5809. post, p. 278 [294 P.2d 29], 
I would reverse the judgment in the case at bar. 
